Suppose, that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother, which causes first love or hatred, and afterwards pride or humility, we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves, without any immediate connexion with the person, who is related to us: Experience shews us, that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke, and that the mind is not conveyed from one passion to another, as in the preceding instance.

We never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; though it is evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility.

The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility.

This may at first sight be esteemed contrary to my hypothesis; since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same.

Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred.