It is plain, that, according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along required.

The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion.

But to judge only from the situation of affairs, I should not expect, that the affections would rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression.

As there is here a person, who by means of a double relation is the object of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carryed farther.

The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride or humility.