Now since it is granted there is a delight or uneasiness still attending merit or demerit of every kind, this is all that is requisite for my purpose.
But I go farther, and observe, that this moral hypothesis and my present system not only agree together, but also that, allowing the former to be just, it is an absolute and invincible proof of the latter.

For if all morality be founded on the pain or pleasure, which arises from the prospect of any loss or advantage, that may result from our own characters, or from those of others, all the effects of morality must-be derived from the same pain or pleasure, and among the rest, the passions of pride and humility.

The very essence of virtue, according to this hypothesis, is to produce pleasure and that of vice to give pain.

The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility.

What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas?
The same unquestionable argument may be derived from the opinion of those, who maintain that morality is something real, essential, and founded on nature.