[A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume]@TWC D-Link book
A Treatise of Human Nature

PART II
17/63

Ideas always represent the Objects or impressions, from which they are derived, and can never without a fiction represent or be applied to any other.

By what fiction we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable, and suppose, as is common, that duration is a measure of rest as well as of motion, we shall consider [Sect 5.] afterwards.
There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible.

This argument may be worth the examining.
Every idea, that is distinguishable, being also separable, let us take one of those simple indivisible ideas, of which the compound one of extension is formed, and separating it from all others, and considering it apart, let us form a judgment of its nature and qualities.
It is plain it is not the idea of extension.

For the idea of extension consists of parts; and this idea, according to t-he supposition, is perfectly simple and indivisible.

Is it therefore nothing?
That is absolutely impossible.


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