Such an evil is nothing in comparison with that of losing the money necessary for inevitable expence by entrusting it to a bad Bank, or that of recovering this money by identifying the national credit with the bad Bank and so propping it up and perpetuating it.

So long as the security of the Money Market is not entirely to be relied on, the Government of a country had much better leave it to itself and keep its own money.

If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue bad and will probably become worse if the Government sustains and encourages them.

The cardinal maxim is, that any aid to a present bad Bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future good Bank.
When the trade of Banking began to be better understood, when the Banking system was thoroughly secure, the Government might begin to lend gradually; especially to lend the unusually large sums which even under the most equable system of finance will at times accumulate in the public exchequer.
Under a natural system of banking it would have every facility.
Where there were many banks keeping their own reserve, and each most anxious to keep a sufficient reserve, because its own life and credit depended on it, the risk of the Government in keeping a banker would be reduced to a minimum.

It would have the choice of many bankers, and would not be restricted to any one.
Its course would be very simple, and be analogous to that of other public bodies in the country.