In fact, the whole plan would seem to an Englishman of business palpably absurd; he would not consider it, he would not think it worth considering.

That it works fairly well in France, and that there are specious arguments of theory for it, would not be sufficient to his mind.
All such changes being out of the question, I can propose only three remedies.
First.

There should be a clear understanding between the Bank and the public that, since the Bank hold out ultimate banking reserve, they will recognise and act on the obligations which this implies; that they will replenish it in times of foreign demand as fully, and Lend it in times of internal panic as freely and readily, as plain principles of banking require.
This looks very different from the French plan, but it is not so different in reality.

In England we can often effect, by the indirect compulsion of opinion, what other countries must effect by the direct compulsion of Government.

We can do so in this case.