There is no relation or connection between the two.

And the State, in getting the Bank to keep what money it may chance to have, or in borrowing of it what money it may chance to want, does not hire it to stop a panic or much help it if it tries.
The real reason has not been distinctly seen.

As has been already said--but on account of its importance and perhaps its novelty it is worth saying again--whatever bank or banks keep the ultimate banking reserve of the country must lend that reserve most freely in time of apprehension, for that is one of the characteristic uses of the bank reserve, and the mode in which it attains one of the main ends for which it is kept.

Whether rightly or wrongly, at present and in fact the Bank of England keeps our ultimate bank reserve, and therefore it must use it in this manner.
And though the Bank of England certainly do make great advances in time of panic, yet as they do not do so on any distinct principle, they naturally do it hesitatingly, reluctantly, and with misgiving.
In 1847, even in 1866--the latest panic, and the one in which on the whole the Bank acted the best--there was nevertheless an instant when it was believed the Bank would not advance on Consols, or at least hesitated to advance on them.

The moment this was reported in the City and telegraphed to the country, it made the panic indefinitely worse.