The notes went out, but they did not return.

They were issued as loans to the public, but the public wanted no more; they never presented them for payment; they never asked that sovereigns should be given for them.
But the acceptance of a great liability during an augmenting alarm, though not as bad as an equal advance of cash, is the thing next worst.

At any moment the cash may be demanded.

Supposing the panic to grow, it will be demanded, and the reserve will be lessened accordingly.
No doubt all precautions may, in the end, be unavailing.

'On extraordinary occasions,' says Ricardo, 'a general panic may seize the country, when every one becomes desirous of possessing himself of the precious metals as the most convenient mode of realising or concealing his property, against such panic banks have no security _on any system_.' The bank or banks which hold the reserve may last a little longer than the others; but if apprehension pass a certain bound, they must perish too.