But nothing is there, except the passion of ill-will or absolute indifference.

You cannot say that these, of themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes.

No, they are only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed and displayed good-will towards us.

Consequently, we may infer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual FACT; but arises from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the spectator, excites the SENTIMENT of blame, by the particular structure and fabric of his mind.
This representation, you say, is false.

Crime, indeed, consists not in a particular FACT, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it consists in certain MORAL RELATIONS, discovered by reason, in the same manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra.
But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk?
In the case stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other.