It is impossible otherwise.
-- Yes! The old, familiar language! Were one of Plato's fellow-pilgrims here, or a follower of Epicurus--or fifty others--each would tell me that I should never get to Corinth except in his company.
One must therefore credit all alike, which would be absurd; or, what is far safer, distrust all alike, until one has discovered the truth.
Suppose now, that, being as I am, ignorant which of all philosophers is really in possession of truth, I choose your sect, relying on yourself--my friend, indeed, yet still acquainted only with the way of the Stoics; and that then some divine power brought Plato, and Aristotle, and Pythagoras, and the others, back to life again.

Well! They would come round about me, and put me on my trial for my presumption, and say:--'In whom was it you confided when you preferred Zeno and Chrysippus to me ?--and me ?--masters of far more venerable age than those, who are but of yesterday; and though you have never held any discussion with us, nor made trial of our doctrine?
It is not thus that the law would have judges do--listen to one party and refuse to let the other speak for himself.

If judges act thus, there may be an appeal to another tribunal.' What should I answer?
Would it [156] be enough to say:--'I trusted my friend Hermotimus ?'--'We know not Hermotimus, nor he us,' they would tell me; adding, with a smile, 'your friend thinks he may believe all our adversaries say of us whether in ignorance or in malice.

Yet if he were umpire in the games, and if he happened to see one of our wrestlers, by way of a preliminary exercise, knock to pieces an antagonist of mere empty air, he would not thereupon pronounce him a victor.

Well! don't let your friend Hermotimus suppose, in like manner, that his teachers have really prevailed over us in those battles of theirs, fought with our mere shadows.