[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link book
The Ethics

PREFACE
12/68

For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV.

lix.).

Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised.

For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III.

iii.).
PROP.V.An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof .-- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III.


<<Back  Index  Next>>

D-Link book Top

TWC mobile books