xviii.
of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason.

The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III.lvii.

note).

It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.

On these points see the following note.
Note II .-- In the Appendix to Part I.I undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III.xxix.