[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link book
The Ethics

PREFACE
50/145

note); wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.

Q.E.D.
Note .-- This is also self--evident; for, if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.

So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.
PROP.XXXIII.

Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.
Proof .-- The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III.Deff.i., ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III.

vii.), by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III.


<<Back  Index  Next>>

D-Link book Top

TWC mobile books