If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion.

Q.E.D.
Note I .-- This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf.III.xxii.

note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.
Corollary I .-- If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
Proof .-- This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III.xxii.is proved from III.

xxi.
Corollary II .-- We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.
Proof .-- If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary III .-- We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.
Proof .-- That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf.III.

xiii.); in other words (III.ix.