[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link bookThe Ethics PART III 21/150
xxiii.) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III.
vii.) conscious of its own endeavour. Note .-- This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform. Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it. PROP.X.An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto. Proof .-- Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated therein (III.
v.).
Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.
Coroll.); that is (II.xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our mind, &c.
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