vi.), as it is in itself.

But (I.xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.
PROP.XLV.

Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Proof .-- The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (II.

viii.).

Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I.xv.); but, inasmuch as (II.