His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.

This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.
Corollary II .-- It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis specie).
Proof .-- It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (II.

xliv.).

Reason perceives this necessity of things (II.

xli.) truly--that is (I.Ax.