xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner.

For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will.

Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.
PROP.XXXIII.

Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.
Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop.

xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way (Prop.