For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props.viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can be multiplied and divided.
So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided.

Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points.

This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum.

For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as before?
And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?
Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one can exist without the other, and can remain in its original condition.

As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided.
If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity?
I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect.