The Washington authorities had behaved better than those in actual command of the expedition at one crisis.

Immediately after the first day's fighting around Santiago the latter had hinted by cable to Washington that they might like to withdraw, and Washington had emphatically vetoed the proposal.

I record this all the more gladly because there were not too many gleams of good sense shown in the home management of the war; although I wish to repeat that the real blame for this rested primarily with us ourselves, the people of the United States, who had for years pursued in military matters a policy that rendered it certain that there would be ineptitude and failure in high places if ever a crisis came.
After the siege the people in Washington showed no knowledge whatever of the conditions around Santiago, and proposed to keep the army there.
This would have meant that at least three-fourths of the men would either have died or have been permanently invalided, as a virulent form of malaria was widespread, and there was a steady growth of dysentery and other complaints.

No object of any kind was to be gained by keeping the army in or near the captured city.

General Shafter tried his best to get the Washington authorities to order the army home.