The American attitude had already been expressed in the Chinese Exclusion Act.

As yet the chief difficulty was with that nation, but it was inevitable that such distinctions would prove particularly galling to the rising spirit of the Japanese.
John Hay was keenly aware of the possibilities involved in these Far Eastern events.

Of profound moment under any circumstances, they were doubly so now that the United States was territorially involved.

To take a slice of this Eastern area was a course quite open to the United States and one which some of the powers at least would have welcomed.
Hay, however, wrote to Paul Dana on March 16, 1899, as follows: "We are, of course, opposed to the dismemberment of that empire [China], and we do not think that the public opinion of the United States would justify this Government in taking part in the great game of spoliation now going on." He felt also that the United States should not tie its hands by "formal alliances with other Powers interested," nor was he prepared "to assure China that we would join her in repelling that demand by armed force." It remained, then, for the Secretary of State to find a lever for peaceful interference on the part of his country and a plan for future operations.

The first he found in the commercial interest of the United States.