The President had already made himself the spokesman of the popular demand for a substantial reduction of taxes.

Such a combination of forces in favor of lightening the popular burden might seem to be constitutionally irresistible, but by adroit maneuvering the congressional supporters of protection managed to have the war rates generally maintained and, in some cases, even increased.

The case is a typical example of the way in which advantage of strategic position in a governmental system can prevail against mere numbers.
By the Act of May 15, 1882, a tariff commission was created to examine the industrial situation and make recommendations as to rates of duty.
The President appointed men who stood high in the commercial world and who were strongly attached to the protective system.

They applied themselves to their task with such energy that by December 4, 1882, they had produced a voluminous report with suggested amendments to customs laws.
But the advocates of high protection in the House were not satisfied; they opposed the recommendations of the report and urged that the best and quickest way to reduce taxation was by abolishing or reducing items on the internal revenue list.

This policy not only commanded support on the Republican side, but also received the aid of a Democratic faction which avowed protectionist principles and claimed party sanction for them.